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504 
THE RIGHT TO DESTROY UNDER DROIT D’AUTEUR: A 
THEORETICAL MORAL RIGHT OR A TOOL OF ART SPEECH? 
SOFIE G. SYED* 
In recent years, French artists have asserted the right to destroy their 
own work as a dramatic means of enforcing the right to preserve the 
integrity of their expression.1 In 2007, conceptual artist Daniel Buren 
decried the French Ministry of Culture for allowing his famous columns at 
the Palais Royal in Paris to fall into disrepair. Commenters argued that 
Buren’s columns conveyed a political message symbolizing inter-party 
collaboration, and that the Ministry of Culture was conveying a partisan 
statement by permitting their deterioration.2 Buren’s threat to destroy his 
columns received significant media coverage,3 and resulted in the 
allocation of six million euros for the restoration of the work.4 In 2014, 
artist Alain Mila announced that he intended to destroy one of his 
sculptures, after a local politician painted the work the color of the right-
wing party Front National without Mila’s consent.5 In both cases, the 
government’s treatment of the work resulted in a potential threat to the 
dignity of the artist, and the invocation of the right to destroy generated 
public debate about the boundaries of the moral right of integrity in 
practice. 
 
 *   The author would like to thank Professor Tim Wu for his guidance and the Journal staff for 
their hard work on this piece. 
 1.  This right may be grounded in the rights to exclude or withdraw one’s work; authors claiming 
the right to destroy in the French context have not explicitly cited a consistent legal theory. See infra 
part II. 
 2.  John Lichfield, Les Deux Plateaux: Monument to the French malaise?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 
4, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/les-deux-plateaux-monument-to-the-
french-malaise-768339.html. 
 3.  Artist threatens to take down columns, UPI (Dec. 31, 2007), 
http://www.upi.com/Entertainment_News/2007/12/31/Artist-threatens-to-take-down-
columns/27321199152254/. 
 4.   James Mackenzie & Elizabeth Pineau, Paris Palais Royal colums get 6 million euro facelift, 
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/08/us-france-sculpture-
idUSTRE6074AX20100108. 
 5. Le maire FN de Hayange juge “sinistre” une sculpture, il la fait repeindre [The FN Mayor of 
Hayange Repaints a “Sinister” Sculpture], L’EXPRESS (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/le-maire-fn-de-hayange-juge-sinistre-une-sculpture-il-la-
fait-repeindre_1562581.html. 
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In contrast to these cases, street artists who work in mediums in which 
destruction of their work is inevitable reveal a different relationship to the 
right to destroy, integrating destruction into their work in a way that 
challenges traditional ways of viewing and commodifying art. These artists 
need not formally assert a right to destroy, as the nature of the shared space 
in which they produce art links destruction to the creation of new works.  
Whether an artist seeks destruction to preserve a specific authorial 
intent, or implicitly consents to destruction so that other artists may make 
use of a shared canvas, destruction facilitates discourses on the relationship 
between art and political speech. The right to destroy can serve various 
purposes, which may or may not correspond to the moral rights rationale 
underpinning droit d’auteur. This paper seeks to examine the intersection 
of droit d’auteur and art speech, in order to compare the theory of the right 
to destroy with its actual application. In practice, do French artists use this 
right to gain leverage in negotiations, as a speech safeguard, as an assumed 
element of particular mediums of expression, or for some other purpose? 
First, I examine the history of moral rights, including the spectrum of 
moral rights that is currently protected under French copyright law. Next, I 
consider the potential theoretical bases for a right to destroy, using modern 
examples from across Europe. Third, I analyze disputes over the pre-
disclosure assertion of the artist’s right to destroy the work as a means of 
retaining artistic control. Finally, I juxtapose the foregoing against a new 
context to frame destruction—street art created on “revolving canvases”—
to demonstrate how destruction comes into play to either protect or reject 
economic rights entirely. 
I.  DROIT D’AUTEUR AND MORAL RIGHTS 
Copyright law has been justified according to a variety of rationales, 
including the promotion of economic incentives, the development of 
emerging industries, and the protection of the moral rights of creators. The 
French droit d’auteur (right of the author), which protects “works of the 
mind,” is known for its strong affiliation with the moral rights of authors. 
While the moral rights component of droit d’auteur is well established, the 
author’s interest in commercial exploitation of their work may be equally 
compelling, and may be implicated even when the author cites moral 
rationales for the assertion of a particular right. In order to understand the 
relationship between the moral and economic rights theories, it is necessary 
to delve into the historical development of droit d’auteur. 
Droit d’auteur protects both the economic rights (droit patrimoniaux) 
and moral rights (droit moral) of an author. Though “moral” appears to be 
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a cognate, its meaning in French includes connotations such as “spiritual,” 
“non-economic,” and “personal.”6 Droit moral is premised on a conception 
of the author having a unique relationship to his work, by “infus[ing] into 
his work something of his own creative personality.”7 Thus, droit d’auteur 
aims to protect the personality of the author by protecting the integrity of 
their work, protection that is available “by the mere fact of its creation.”8 
The focus on the author’s contribution is apparent in the statutory language 
of droit d’auteur. For example, originality under droit d’auteur is defined 
as “a print of the author’s personality,”9 though in practice, originality is 
analyzed similarly as in the United States. 
French law does not just view the creative act as investing some of the 
author into the work, but contextualizes it as occurring in a society whose 
interests oppose those of the author.10 Droit d’auteur thus seeks to protect 
the author’s work as a “gift . . . to the world,” for which the author has “a 
moral right to expect that society respect his creative genius.”11  Despite its 
history, the moral right aspect of droit d’auteur has been characterized as a 
“mere derogation from the normal exploitation of a work.”12 Support for 
this view comes from the Cour de Cassation’s conclusion that moral rights 
are separate from personality rights, as well as the decision that legal 
entities may exercise moral rights over a work.13 Jean-Luc Pitroaut argues 
that although the French Intellectual Property Code attaches inalienable 
moral rights to the author’s person, “droit moral is often exploited for 
economic purposes under a remunerated waiver.”14 
On the other hand, Russell DaSilva describes droit moral as “the very 
core of the French droit d’auteur, for it is by virtue of the moral right that 
 
 6.  Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of 
French and American Copyright Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 595 (2006) 
(quoting SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
WORKS: 1886–1986, at 456 (1987)). 
 7.  Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights 
in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 11 (1980). 
 8.   CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] [intellectual property code] art. 
L.111-1. 
 9.  Scott A. Cromar, Note, COPYRIGHT & MORAL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. AND FRANCE, at 8 (May 
1, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898326; see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 1e civ., June 30, 1988, Bull. civ. I, 178, 2137. 
 10.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 11. 
 11.  Id. at 12. 
 12.  Piotraut, supra note 7, at 596 (quoting Professor Jacques Raynard). 
 13.  Id. (citing Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 10, 
1993, Bull. civ. I, 7, 78). 
 14.  Id. at 614. 
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an author may secure and assert his pecuniary interests.”15 The nature of 
moral rights is complicated by the difficulty in categorizing certain rights 
as either economic or moral. For example, the droit de suite (royalty right) 
protects rights of future resales for fifty years after the author’s death. 
Despite its appearance as an exploitation right, some scholars view it as a 
third category of droit d’auteur based on its origins as a moral right.16 
A.   History of Droit Moral 
The exact origins of moral rights are often attributed to the period 
preceding the French Revolution, but some scholars connect these 
principles to social norms and industry customs developed far earlier. 
According to Katharina de la Durantaye, though the ancient Romans had 
no laws protecting authors’ rights, “powerful social norms governing 
conceptions of public morals and individual honor” protected interests that 
parallel modern droit moral.17 Practices respecting the author’s interests in 
disclosure, attribution, and integrity of the work were common, but differed 
from droit moral in that they were based on social relationships between 
individuals rather than the work’s relationship to the author’s personality. 
Further, these “rudimentary” protections only applied to writers, not to 
other Roman artists, and were strongest for males with elite social 
standing.18 Susan P. Liemer concludes that this early precursor to droit 
moral “did not exist as individual, legally-protected human rights,” because 
“the creative process was not protected for its own sake as the expression 
of an individual’s own consciousness.”19 
While scholars recognize the influence of Roman law on 19th century 
French law, the act of locating the roots of droit moral in Roman law is 
highly contested. Traditional Roman law was divided into three categories: 
the law of persons, of property, and of obligations, none of which appeared 
a proper home for legal protections afforded to authors.20 The law of 
persons was inappropriate as a source of droit d’auteur, because authors’ 
rights were not based on rules governing the status of persons. The law of 
 
 15.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 5. 
 16.  Id. at 4. 
 17.  Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of Literary Authorship in Ancient 
Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 38 (2007). 
 18.  Id; see Susan P. Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How Non-Economic Rights Came 
to be Protected in French Law, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 65, 75 n.54 (2011). 
 19.  Liemer, supra note 19, at 76. 
 20.  Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 
95 (2007). 
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obligations was an unlikely source because authors’ rights in rem went 
beyond liability rules.21 Since the law of property, as used in 19th century 
law, was limited to rights in tangible things, this source was also an 
unlikely basis for later droit d’auteur.22 However, Liemer presents the 
relationship between de la Durantaye’s analysis and droit moral as a distant 
analogy in which the dynamics of strong social norms foreshadowed 
cultural developments that were eventually imported into the law. By 
viewing its Roman roots in a broader historical context rather than legal 
theory, Liemer presents the common strain in artistic custom as an alternate 
explanation for the emergence of moral rights in droit d’auteur. 
Liemer argues that the next stage in the development of preconditions 
for droit moral was the establishment of artistic control over a work, 
exercised by well-known artists of the Renaissance in the 16th century. 
Leading into the Renaissance, works of art were not considered individual 
products, due to the patronage and guild systems. As patrons and guilds 
controlled the artist’s material options and training, and Christian ideals 
labeled artistic inspiration as God-given, artists merely executed the work 
as “craftsmen,” rather than creating it as authors.23 
Prominent artists such as Michelangelo Buonarrotti and Albrecht 
Dürer changed the model of artistic production. Michelangelo’s refusal to 
allow the Pope to enter the Sistine Chapel while he was painting 
constituted an act of control over disclosure, whereas his decision to chisel 
his name into a sculpture was an assertion of attribution.24 Dürer’s use of 
printing technology to reproduce and sell his famous engravings allowed 
him to amass his own wealth, as he could market his work outside of the 
patronage and guild systems.25 As these artists took on unprecedented 
control over their work, European rulers started to grant them limited 
exclusive rights in order to encourage industry development.26 
According to Elizabeth Armstrong, the late 15th and early 16th 
centuries saw the establishment of legal precedents enabling writers to sue 
printers for control over their work.27 Authors sought not only to protect 
their economic rights, but also to protect non-economic rights such as the 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Liemer, supra note 19, at 76–77. 
 24.  Id. at 78. 
 25.  Id. at 81. 
 26.  Id. at 79. 
 27.  Id. at 83–84 (citing ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, BEFORE COPYRIGHT: THE FRENCH BOOK-
PRIVILEGE SYSTEM 1498–1526, at 12–20, 55–62 (Cambridge University Press 1990)). 
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reputational interest, extremely valuable in the context of the prevailing 
social hierarchy. This reputational interest motivated authors to contest 
misattribution and start appending their own coat of arms to a work, instead 
of their patron’s coat of arms.28 
The next stage in the emergence of norms supporting droit moral 
occurred in La Comédie-Française under the ancien régime. Liemer posits 
that the regulations concerning the Comédie-Francaise playwrights provide 
“the true origins of le droit moral,”29 in contrast with the commonly 
accepted view attributing droit moral to modern French philosophers. The 
Comédie-Française was the most eminent repertory French theater of the 
17th and 18th centuries, regulated by a group of nobles close to the king 
known as the First Gentlemen of the Royal Bedchamber.30 Instead of 
closely monitoring the playwrights, the First Gentlemen set forth 
regulations over their practices. An overseer communicated directly with 
the playwrights, giving them an opportunity to have some influence over 
the regulations to which they were subjected. The interests that playwrights 
sought to have protected by the regulations reflected the conundrum they 
faced as upper middle class commoners relying on the support of nobles, 
whose social codes of conduct discouraged the appearance of striving for 
wealth.31 Comédie-Française playwrights had a strong interest in protecting 
their reputations, as the development of one’s career was contingent on 
cultivating a reputation as a “man of courtly honor.”32 
Comédie-Française playwrights maneuvered to promote interests 
correlating to the main droit moral recognized under French law today. 
Securing the presentation of one’s play constituted an early disclosure 
right, just as controlling the ways in which the theater group presented the 
play functioned as an integrity right. After a play finished its initial run, it 
became the property of the troupe. However, if a play was revived after its 
initial run, the playwright could expect to consult with the troupe on 
creative decisions, though he did not receive any of the profits from the 
revival.33 Thus, the economic right was separated from the integrity right, 
with the latter attaching to the author instead of the work.34 Both the 
economic and personality rights of the playwrights were labeled propriété 
 
 28.  See Liemer, supra note 19, at 87–88. 
 29.  Id. at 93, 95. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 96–97. 
 32.  Id. at 98. 
 33.  Id. at 101. 
 34.  Id. 
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or droits, all of which were owed to the author, “because of their status as 
Comédie-Française playwrights.”35 Not only were the droit moral 
recognized, they may have been even more important to authors than the 
fruits of their economic rights at times. Liemer notes that playwrights 
would donate their share of the box office proceeds to charity, in order to 
enhance the appearance of quasi-nobility that sustained their reputations.36 
In contrast to the ancient Roman and Renaissance analogues to droit 
moral, the Comédie-Française norms are directly linked to the 
promulgation of intellectual property law during the Revolutionary period. 
Nineteen playwrights signed a petition to the National Assembly proposing 
specific provisions for theater law, which the chair of the Constitution 
Committee, Isaac Le Chapelier, incorporated into a law submitted to the 
Assembly.37 The proposals provided that performance of a play by a living 
playwright would require his consent, and the playwright’s heirs would 
own the work for five years after his death before it entered the public 
domain.38 Le Chapelier described an author’s work as “the most personal of 
all properties,” “the fruit of a writer’s thought,” and “a property of a type 
totally different from other properties.”39 The National Assembly approved 
the proposal in 1791, passing the first French intellectual property statute.40 
Though the 1791 law gave clearer protection to economic rights than 
moral rights, which were not explicitly defined, it enabled playwrights to 
sign theater contracts through which they could exercise control over 
disclosure, attribution, and the integrity of their work. A 1793 law 
expanded the 1791 rights from playwrights to all writers, engravers, 
painters and composers. The 1804 Napoleonic Code incorporated both 
laws, governing intellectual property in France until the passage of the 
1957 statute.41 According to Liemer, the influence of the Comédie-
Française customs continued to be seen in the judiciary’s interpretation of 
these laws. Though post-Revolution judges limited the appearance of 
judicial lawmaking in order to differentiate themselves from the ancien 
régime, multiple decisions protected droit moral beyond the scope of the 
explicit text of the statutes. Liemer argues this is evidence that “an 
awareness of the interests protected by le droit moral was already part of 
 
 35.  Id. at 102. 
 36.  Id. at 103. 
 37.  Id. at 106. 
 38.  Id. at 107. 
 39.  Id. at 108. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 110. 
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the social fabric,” such that judges had a common understanding that 
enabled broader applications of the statutory text.42 
The conventional account of the development of droit moral focuses 
on the impact of European philosophy on French law post-Revolution, 
viewing droit d’auteur as one example of the broader debate on property 
and personality rights.43 Hegel, conceiving of property as “the embodiment 
of personality,” believed that the personhood theory of property was 
especially applicable to works of art.44 Under this theory, the fruit of mental 
labor contains even more of the author’s personality than the fruits of 
physical labor, and must be protected accordingly.45 This implies that the 
author does not waive or transfer their moral interest in the work even 
when they transfer economic rights, with the result that the moral right 
limits the economic right.46 
French judicial decisions demonstrating the growing use of moral 
rights rationales date back to the early 19th century. An 1814 case 
announced the rule, followed consistently thereafter, that “a work sold by 
an author to a publisher or a bookseller must bear the author’s name and 
must be published as sold or delivered, if the author so desires, provided 
that there is no agreement to the contrary.”47 In a later case, author Auguste 
Comte sued his publisher for modifying a work without his approval, by 
adding a statement making negative comments about Comte to his Cours 
de philosophie positive.48 Comte prevailed, as the court ruled that 
publishers could not modify a work without formal authorization by the 
author. While other European countries adopted statutory codes including 
default provisions against forced disclosure of unpublished works, France 
refrained from doing so in the 19th century, instead continuing to develop 
the moral rights of authors through judicial decision-making.49 
In addition to these cases, scholarly debates set forth competing 
rationales for the results reached in French courts. According to Russell 
DaSilva, the philosophical development of modern droit d’auteur occurred 
during three stages beginning in 1793. From 1793 to 1878, the Gastambide 
school of thought argued that droit d’auteur was solely a property right. 
 
 42.  Id. at 112–13. 
 43.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 9. 
 44.  Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread Roses and Copyright, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1542 (1989) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 45.  Id. at 1542, 1549. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 85–86. 
 48.  Id. at 86. 
 49.  Id. at 90–91. 
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The Kantian Renouard school categorized the author’s right as a right of 
personality, separate from the property regime.50 During the 1860s, with the 
growing support for communism, “personalist” writers opposed the 
property characterization and insisted that droit d’auteur was based on a 
right of personality.51 In 1872, Andre Morillot published an article 
analyzing whether an author’s right of publication was attached to their 
person, differentiating moral rights from patrimonial rights on the grounds 
that the former are not subject to pecuniary valuation.52 Morillot supported 
the personhood theory, by comparing the recognition of real property rights 
in literature to “recognizing property rights in human beings, which was 
legally impossible lest one were to allow the sale of people into slavery.”53 
Less than a decade later, Morillot described the patrimonial and moral 
rights of the author as completely distinct and separable, arguing for an 
expanded idea of the author’s moral rights that would survive publication.54 
Three of the main droit moral claimed today under droit d’auteur appeared 
in French jurisprudence by 1880: “droit de divulgation, droit à la paternité, 
and droit au respect de l’œuvre.”55 
The second stage in the development of modern droit d’auteur, from 
1878 to 1902, witnessed growing support for the personalist perspective, 
while Pouillet propounded incorporating both the property and personality 
approaches into a theory of intellectual property.56 German debates over 
authors’ rights became influential across Europe, in particular between 
Alfred Gierke and Joseph Kohler. Gierke considered both patrimonial and 
moral rights as intertwined parts of one whole57 originating from the 
author’s “sphere of personhood.”58 Gierke noted that no other theory 
explained the use of the author’s lifespan as the unit defining the duration 
of their rights in their work.59 Kohler did not deny the existence of 
personality rights, but “insisted on a clear conceptual separation between 
alienable rights of authors in their works (copyrights) and inalienable rights 
of authors in their personhood (rights of personality).”60 
 
 50.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 51.  Id. at 9–10. 
 52.  Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 100. 
 53.  Id. at 101. 
 54.  Id. at 102–03. 
 55.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 10. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 10–11. 
 58.  Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 97. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 99. 
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Kohler’s approach, in which “droit d’auteur is considered to be a right 
of ‘propriété incorporelle’ separable into moral and patrimonial rights,” 
was adopted in France during DaSilva’s third period, spanning from 1902 
to 1957.61 In 1902, the French Supreme Court recognized dualist theory in 
the Lecocq case. Lecocq was a divorce case in which the Court allowed the 
inclusion of an author’s rights as marital assets, as their inclusion would not 
affect the author’s “ability, ‘inherent in his personhood,’ to modify or 
suppress his work.”62 French legal scholars at the time also acknowledged 
dualism as the prevailing framework.63 
B.  Current Protections for Droit Moral 
The four major moral rights protected by droit d’auteur include droit 
de divulgation (the right of disclosure), droit à la paternité de l’œuvre (the 
right of attribution), droit au respect de l’œuvre (the right to claim respect 
for the integrity of the work), and droit de repentir ou de retrait (the right 
of modification or withdrawal).64 French IP Law L121-1 describes the 
rights of attribution and integrity, attaching to the author’s person, as 
“perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.” These inalienable moral rights 
can be exercised after a work has entered the public domain.65 In contrast, 
scholars argue that the withdrawal and modification rights are not 
perpetual, unless the author directly transfers those rights to their heirs.66 
1.  Right of Disclosure 
The right of disclosure concerns the author’s right to publish, sell or 
unveil the work. The protection of the disclosure right “stems from a belief 
that only the artist himself can determine when a work is completed, and 
also from a recognition of the fact that public disclosure of a work has a 
direct impact on the artist’s reputation.”67 So long as the work is still a 
“rough draft,” no person except the author can claim a property right in it.68 
Three major cases played a role in the emergence of the disclosure right in 
French jurisprudence: Whistler, Camoin, and Rouault. 
 
 61.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 11. 
 62.  See Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 104. 
 63.  Id. at 104–105. 
 64.  See Piotraut, supra note 7, at 597. 
 65.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 5. 
 66.  Piotraut, supra note 7, at 611. 
 67.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 17. 
 68.  Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French 
Law, 16 AM J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1968). 
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In the 1891 Whistler case, Lord Eden sued artist James Whistler to 
compel the delivery of a portrait of his wife. Lord Eden had commissioned 
Whistler to paint the portrait, but Whistler withheld delivery after a 
payment dispute. However, Whistler claimed he had not delivered the 
portrait because he was not satisfied with the work. The court held that the 
artist could not be compelled to deliver a work if he was unsatisfied.69 
Whistler’s right to “remain the master of his work” could not be ceded via 
contract.70 
In 1931, the French judiciary further explored the disclosure right in 
Camoin. Charles Camoin was an expressionist painter who filed suit when  
paintings which he had destroyed and discarded were restored and placed 
for auction by writer Francis Caro.71 The Paris Court of Appeals 
emphasized that because the author’s moral right in the work attaches to his 
person, “the gesture of the painter who lacerates a painting and throws 
away the pieces because he is dissatisfied with his composition does not 
impair this right.”72 Caro’s ownership of the physical pieces of the work 
was undisputed, but did not extend to Camoin’s moral right “which he 
always retains over his work.”73 The court ordered the destruction of the 
work according to Camoin’s wishes, a decision criticized by Nast. Nast 
argued that the court should have instead ordered the deletion of Camoin’s 
signature from the paintings and the prohibition of the use of his name in 
connection with sale or exhibition.74 Nast’s solution fails to take into 
account the practical obstacles to a post-litigation imposition of anonymity 
as well as the underlying theory of moral rights. Under moral rights theory, 
the artist’s personality inheres in the work, affording the artist unique 
control over certain terms of its existence. If the artist seeks to destroy the 
work, court-ordered removal of their name does not accomplish the same 
purpose in the eyes of the author. 
Rouault addressed the question of determining when an author agrees 
to disclose their work. Artist Georges Rouault claimed that his dealer’s 
heirs could not auction over 800 of his unfinished paintings. Rouault had 
accepted advances from the dealer and stored the paintings on the dealer’s 
 
 69.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 18; Judgment of Mar. 20, 1895, Trib. Civ. Seine, [1898] D.P.2. 465; 
Judgment of Dec. 2, 1897, Cour d’Appel Paris; Judgment of May 14, 1900, Cass. Civ., [1900] D.P.1. 
5000. 
 70.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 468. 
 71.  Id.; DaSilva, supra note 8, at 18–19; Judgment of Mar. 6, 1931, Cour d’Appel Paris, [1931] 
D.P.2. 88. 
 72.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 468. 
 73.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 74.  Id. at 469. 
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property, but the court found for the artist, distinguishing between a buyer 
who has negotiated to purchase a work after its future completion and a 
buyer who has purchased a completed work.75 Critics of the decision note 
that the court did not identify criteria for completion, failing to separate the 
question of completion from that of disclosure.76 The diversity in authorial 
practices would render it difficult to choose a universal criterion, because 
even the widely acknowledged symbol of completion, the signature, is not 
used by all artists. In Rouault, the court relied on the artist’s testimony that 
his work was unfinished.77 While this approach respects the author’s 
perspective, it also could enable authors to manipulate circumstances to suit 
their desires by denying completion even where their individual practices 
would point to the work being finished. 
As developed in these early cases, the nature of the disclosure right is 
personal, discretionary, and exclusive. An author may exercise this right to 
refuse to complete a commissioned work or to deliver a completed work, 
though they must pay damages. Once the damages have been paid for such 
a refusal, the artist may disclose the work at a future time as they please.78 
2.  Right to Paternity (Authorship) 
The 1957 statute established the author’s right “to have his name, his 
status as author, and his work respected.”79 Thus, the author can attach their 
name to the work, attach their chosen pseudonym, or produce the work 
anonymously. Authors cannot be required to maintain pseudonymity or 
anonymity in relation to their work under contract.80 This right also guards 
against misattribution, where another person claims the author’s work and 
where the author is incorrectly recognized for authorship of someone else’s 
work.81 
Though some have characterized this right as the simplest droit moral, 
debate continues as to whether one can abandon their authorship. Henri 
Desbois argues that an author cannot waive authorship, analogizing 
authorial paternity to biological paternity, while Pierre Recht casts a 
prohibition on the waiver of authorship as itself paternalistic, and 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
 77.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 470. 
 78.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 20. 
 79.  Id. at 26. 
 80.  Guille c. Colman, Cour d’Appel, Paris, [1967] Gaz. Pal.1.17; see Sarraute, supra note 69, at 
478–79. 
 81.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 478–79. 
8 SYED - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/16 9:45 AM 
516 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:504 
unnecessarily protective over authors.82 The boundaries of this right have 
also been contested in terms of its inclusion of the author’s reputational 
interest. According to the exact text of the 1957 statute, “an author’s right 
to be recognized as the creator of his work is not the same as his right to 
safeguard his reputation.”83 Sarraute argues that artists could manipulate 
courts into guaranteeing higher prices for their works by conflating the 
paternity and reputational interests, on the premise that the sale of their 
work at low prices harms their reputation.84 
3.  Right to Respect (Integrity) 
The integrity right enables the artist to protect his work against 
mutilation once it has been disclosed to the market. While the integrity 
right was recognized as far back as the 1870s, its key formulation occurred 
in the 1965 Buffet case. Buffet painted different parts of a refrigerator, and 
the refrigerator’s owner sought to sell the pieces separately. The court 
found for Buffet, who argued the piece was indivisible on the grounds of 
the integrity right.85 
The integrity right has been applied to protect the artist’s reputation, 
with some controversy. To protect his reputation, an artist may exercise the 
right to publish a reply to excessive criticism of the artist himself (but not 
criticism of the work).86 Further limitations have been created by French 
courts, such as the focus on the “material integrity of the work,” which 
mandates finding a violation of the integrity right only where the piece has 
been physically mutilated.87 In addition, some courts have held the integrity 
right does not allow the author to prevent a subsequent owner from 
destroying the work. The rationale for this limitation is that total 
destruction of a work does not threaten the honor of the artist by falsely 
presenting alterations as the artist’s decisions.88 
The integrity right is more complicated in the context of adaptations, 
where the right of the original author may conflict with the prerogative of 
the adapter creating their own work. Authors seek to resolve this conflict 
via contracts falling into three categories: (1) contracts authorizing 
unconditional adaptation, (2) contracts authorizing all changes and 
 
 82.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 29. 
 83.  Id. at 30. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 31. 
 86.  Id. at 32. 
 87.  Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 88.  Id. at 33. 
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modifications “which do not distort the spirit and character of the original,” 
and (3) contracts in which the original author participates in the creative 
process of the adaptation.89 
4.  Rights of Withdrawal and Modification 
An author may also elect to withdraw or modify their work after 
disclosure based on a “change of conviction.”90 These rights are 
conditioned on advance indemnification of the transferee for any resulting 
prejudice. Furthermore, if the author chooses to republish the work after 
withdrawal, the work must be offered to the original transferee on the terms 
of their original contract. While these rights were discussed before the 1957 
codification, their exact implications are unclear because they are rarely 
exercised. They are limited by both pragmatic and legal challenges, as the 
advance indemnification requirement has the effect of restricting the 
availability of these rights to authors who can afford to indemnify.91 For 
this reason, the withdrawal right has been described by some scholars as 
merely a “theoretician’s fantasy.”92 As to the modification right, once the 
economic rights have been transferred, the author is only permitted to make 
insignificant changes to the work, and the publisher may reject changes that 
were not foreseeable at the execution of the contract.93 
According to Raymond Sarraute, the withdrawal right does not serve a 
useful purpose, because it does not undo the effect of circulating a work. 
Sarraute argues 
Once a thought is expressed, circulated, criticized, it cannot be erased. 
Copies of a book which have been sold cannot be destroyed. The author 
who modifies his views actually has only one recourse: to set them forth 
in a new work. In this sense every work constitutes a critique of an 
author’s previous creations.94 
While these observations are forceful, an author may seek to exercise a 
critique in the form of silencing, not erasing, the original work rather than 
responding to it. If an author’s goal is not to erase a work, but to remove it 
from the sphere of public discourse such that the act of removal itself 
expresses a unique message, withdrawal might serve a purpose consistent 
with broader aims of droit moral. The author can claim paternity over their 
 
 89.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 480–82. 
 90.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 23. 
 91.  Id. at 24. 
 92.  Piotraut, supra note 7, at 608; see also Jane Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative 
Overview, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 269, 275–76 (1988–1989). 
 93.  DaSilva, supra note 8, at 25. 
 94.  Sarraute, supra note 69, at 477. 
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work; they can reject paternity over another’s work. Using this logic, an 
author may (but is not compelled to) submit their work to the public 
market, and should be able to remove their work from that market. 
Regardless of the potential implications of the withdrawal right, it is 
limited to publishing contracts, excluding the fine arts.95 
Sarraute notes that “no writer has found it desirable to ask the courts 
to assess the indemnity he would be required to pay in advance in order to 
secure the chimerical opportunity to attempt to suppress an already 
published work.”96 In a case that came close to broaching withdrawal 
arguments, the Paris Court of Appeals rejected  an author’s argument for 
the removal of their signature. The painter Vlaminck erased his signature 
from a painting on the grounds that it was a forgery. The court required him 
to pay damages, reasoning that if the painting were a forgery, it belonged to 
another, and if it were authentic, Vlaminck did not have a moral right of 
withdrawal after the sale of the work.97 
In recent years, several artists have publicly claimed that they have a 
right to destroy their work, and legal commenters have assumed the 
existence of a right to destroy without clarifying its philosophical basis. 
This discussion contrasts with the historical approach to the withdrawal 
right, whose existence has been contested since the early 20th century.98 
Under the withdrawal right, the artist can do whatever she wants with the 
work, including destruction, once she has withdrawn the work and 
compensated the owner. However, claims based on a right to destroy in 
recent years follow a different type of reasoning, in which the artist seeks 
to protect the integrity of the work through its destruction, bypassing 
withdrawal and remuneration. 
II.  RIGHT TO DESTROY 
Over the past several years, multiple French artists have publicly 
declared their intentions to exercise a right to destroy their own work. The 
right to destroy has seen limited scholarly analysis, because it is rarely 
asserted. Its origins go back to the Roman law concept of jus abutendi, in 
which destruction was “the most extreme recognized property right” and 
served as the boundary against which less extreme rights could be 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 477–78. 
 97.  Id at 477–78. 
 98.  Id. at 477. 
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evaluated.99 Most academic discussion focuses on an owner’s right to 
destroy property they have purchased, rather than an author’s right to 
destroy property they have created. This limits the applicability of those 
discussions to the droit d’auteur context, as the obligations of an owner to 
act as “steward” of a work for the public100 do not apply to an author, who 
is considered the “master” of the work. As such, the author’s moral rights 
permit them not to disclose their work to the public in the first place, and to 
place limits on its distortion post-disclosure. 
Much discussion of the right to destroy is also concerned with notions 
of efficiency and waste101 that are less relevant to property whose primary 
value is in its intellectual and cultural significance, as opposed to finite 
natural resources and property used in industry and development. Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz defines destruction as “when an owner’s acts or 
omissions eliminate the value of all otherwise valuable future interests in a 
durable thing.”102 Economically-oriented definitions of destruction may not 
be appropriate for moral rights analysis, but comparisons to economic 
contexts are useful in understanding the droit d’auteur right to destroy. The 
fact that the exercise of the right to withdrawal, one path to destruction, 
requires ex ante indemnification implicates economic analysis in the 
intersection of moral and patrimonial rights in practice. 
Strahilevitz considers the right to destroy an extreme variation on the 
rights to exclude, to use and to control subsequent alienation. Destruction 
of an object precludes others from accessing it. For some types of property, 
destruction may be the inevitable result of use. Destruction also enables the 
destroyer to prevent its future sale in ways of which they do not approve.103 
In droit d’auteur, the right to destroy may be an extreme variation on the 
right of withdrawal, in which the act of destruction is contingent on 
withdrawal from third party ownership and constitutes an existential 
withdrawal of the work through physical negation. However, perhaps the 
right of withdrawal implicitly precludes destruction, due to the inclusion of 
language requiring the author to offer the work to the original owner in the 
event the author places the work back on the market. If withdrawal were 
limited only to private holding or modification of the work, then 
destruction would not be permitted. The right to destroy is also intertwined 
with the integrity right, as authors who have sought to destroy have argued 
 
 99.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 785–86 (2005). 
 100.  Id. at 791. 
 101.  Id. at 796–807. 
 102.  Id. at 793. 
 103.  Id. at 794. 
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that it is necessary to preserve the authenticity of their work and their 
personality invested in the work. Strahilevitz considers the right to destroy 
a useful basis for posing the question “what is the nature of ownership?” 
Similarly, destruction adds a unique context to the question “what is the 
nature of authorship?” 
In the U.S., destruction to make an expressive point has been 
permitted where it is supported by strong social norms, such as the burial of 
chattel property along with the deceased, a practice approved by funeral 
homes.104 Strahilevitz argues that because property owners generally seek 
to destroy their property for rational reasons, denying their right to destroy 
property that has become “embarrassing, unfashionable, unproductive, or 
obsolete threatens the impulses that spur future creation.”105 An owner’s 
desire to destroy a piece of property may best serve the public interest, so 
that even stewards should be able to destroy. 
Stronger arguments for destruction apply to authors. Under moral 
rights theory, an author is the best judge of their work’s integrity, and can 
judge whether their work has been distorted or allowed to deteriorate to the 
point of compromising its meaning and worth. Public sentiment is not a 
factor in droit d’auteur,  in contrast to the limited American moral rights 
framework offered in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990106 which 
considers whether a work is of “recognized stature.” Since moral rights 
theory is not concerned with economic efficiency, and the author’s 
perspective must be respected even where the public wants the work to be 
preserved as a matter of cultural history, the author should in theory have 
the right to destroy where they see fit. 
A more ambiguous question would be the exercise of the right to 
destroy a particular work in order to preserve the integrity of the author’s 
portfolio as a whole. Do moral rights apply in the aggregate to the artist’s 
entire collection? Arguments in the affirmative would add a dimension to 
personality theory, in that an author may express their originality through a 
body of work, rather than individual works serving as discrete expressions. 
If that is the author’s purpose, their rights vis-à-vis individual works should 
translate to an entire body of work as well. Were a prominent author to 
seek to destroy an entire body of published work, this might run up against 
the boundaries of respect for the author’s autonomy. Destruction of an 
entire life’s work could be deemed destructive to a broader cultural legacy. 
 
 104.  Id. at 801–03. 
 105.  Id. at 820–21. 
 106.  17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (2012) (commonly referred to as “VARA”). 
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Perhaps droit d’auteur is premised on the protection of the author, but such 
protection could produce the extreme result of eliminating all works 
through which an individual has gained the status of author. It would be 
difficult to devise a limiting principle without undermining the moral rights 
rationale entirely. 
Joseph Sax gives greater support to the right of the artist to destroy 
their own work as a form of speech, arguing that the artist should be able to 
control their legacy to the world.107 However, destruction can be more then 
reputational control; it can be its own form of speech. Strahilevitz regards 
destruction as the silencing of speech rather than speech in and of itself,  
reasoning that an author should respond to their previous works through the 
creation of new works, rather than eliminate the work. This approach 
reduces the purposes of destruction by assuming the goal of destruction is 
to un-ring a bell, a desire that is impossible and disingenuous. The 
silencing of speech that an author intends to endure is a real danger where 
the person seeking to exercise the destruction right is not the author. But 
when the author seeks to destroy their own work, they may do so in order 
to send a message whose meaning is contingent on the nature of destruction 
as the vehicle of speech, instead of trying to simply erase their previous 
message.108 In cases where the author wishes to destroy private, 
unpublished works, the denial of that right would have the result of forcing 
their speech.109 Similarly, a categorical ban on post-disclosure withdrawal 
and destruction by an author results in limiting the realm of gestures 
through which an author can speak, a speech restriction of another kind. 
A.  Recent Examples in France 
Several artists have recently threatened to exercise their right to 
destroy, but have not filed suit in court. These incidents reveal the right to 
destroy as a form of speech, wherein even the threat to destroy the work 
carries such weight socially that an author can use it to make a political 
statement. On the other hand, some authors may invoke their right to 
destroy for economic gains, casting doubt on the degree to which 
destruction is established as a purely moral right under droit d’auteur. In 
such cases, perhaps the authors are seeking to exercise the withdrawal 
right, but framing it in terms of the right to destroy to capture maximum 
public attention. 
 
 107.  Id. at 830. 
 108.  Id. at 828–30. 
 109.  Id. at 834. 
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One of the most well-known incidents involving the right to destroy 
concerns the sculptor Daniel Buren’s work Les Deux Plateaux, also known 
as the Buren Columns. Buren constructed the installation,  consisting of a 
fountain and a series of  columns, outside Paris’s Palais Royal in 1986 on 
commission by the French government. In 2007, Buren demanded the 
destruction of the columns, citing the right to respect for his work. He 
accused the French government of allowing his columns to fall into 
disrepair, deteriorating to the point of what he called “state vandalism.”110 
The lighting and fountain components of the installation had ceased 
functioning seven years earlier.111 According to Buren, for the Ministry of 
Culture (whose offices are actually located in the Palais Royal) to allow his 
work to reach such a state was tantamount to displaying half of a work of 
art in a museum. Buren’s public criticism of the Ministry focused on the 
indignity inflicted on his work; he even went so far as to state that the 
pavement on Parisian roads was better maintained.112 Buren explained that 
the intended visual effect of the work relied on the combination of 
columns, electricity, and fountains. Without flowing water, the columns 
were reduced to mere “dustbins.”113 The public location of the work added 
urgency to the task of maintaining its integrity, as millions of people from 
around the world would see the columns in a “half-destroyed” state.114 
Buren’s statements were characterized in the press as particularly 
strident, but his critique went beyond the assertion that the work’s physical 
integrity had been compromised. Buren cast the French government’s 
alleged neglect as a political message. While the columns themselves were 
originally controversial and detested by Parisians, Buren’s installment 
came during a rare moment of bipartisan cooperation in the national 
government. Buren viewed his work as a symbol of that bipartisanship. He 
said of those who supported the neglect of his work, “[i]n these 
commentaries, I can feel the far right reawakening. I see again the old anti-
Lang slogans, the old anti-Semitic insults.”115 
 
 110.  Daniel Buren Menace de Faire Démolir Ses Colonnes [Daniel Buren Threatens to Demolish 
His Columns], 20 MINUTES (Dec. 28, 2007), http://www.20minutes.fr/culture/203391-20071228-
daniel-buren-menace-faire-demolir-colonnes. 
 111.  John Lichfield, Les Deux Plateaux:Monument to the French malaise?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 
4, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/les-deux-plateaux-monument-to-the-
french-malaise-768339.html. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  20 MINUTES, supra note 111. 
 115.  Lichfield, supra note 112 
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Buren’s  arguments in support of the potential exercise of his right to 
destroy the columns was two-fold: (1) under the conventional integrity 
right line of reasoning, the work had been mutilated by the ravages of time, 
and the artist could demand to destroy it in order to protect the work and 
his own moral personality within it; and (2) the deterioration of the work 
was a purposeful political statement by the far right, which co-opted the 
significance of the work according to the artist, hijacking his creation in 
order to implicitly convey a political message he found repugnant. In order 
to stop the use of his work for such speech, which could be viewed as a 
form of misattribution or an infringement of integrity, Buren sought to 
assert his own speech by destroying the work. 
Buren based his public demands on the right to integrity, stating “an 
artist has moral rights over his works . . . . That’s what I am fighting for.”116 
While he explicitly stated his desire to destroy the columns, he also noted 
that he would prefer the government provide funds to repair the works to 
avoid that “most absurd outcome.”117 Thus, Buren threatened the use of his 
right to destroy as a rhetorical tool, acknowledging that it was the last 
resort. His public campaign was successful. In 2010, the French 
government allocated six million euros to restore the columns with Buren’s 
approval.118 
Buren used droit moral in order to secure funding for his work, but 
because of the public nature of the work and the fact that he did not extract 
any additional funds for personal use, it seems that Buren’s moral rights 
arguments concerning integrity and speech were sincere. In this way, the 
Buren Column incident differs from another high profile example of an 
artist invoking the right to destroy: Jean-Pierre Raynaud and his Neubauer 
sculpture. Raynaud did not seek to destroy his work, but to prevent its 
destruction. Looking at the right to destroy as an example of the property 
right to exclude, Raynaud’s position represents an alternative way in which 
an author can manipulate the right to destroy for his own ends. 
The Neubauer car dealership bought a building in which Raynaud had 
installed one of his sculptures for a previous owner. The exact location of 
the sculpture at the entrance of the building posed a problem for the 
dealership, and Neubauer sought to move the sculpture. Under French law, 
 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  James Mackenzie & Elizabeth Pineau, Paris Palais Royal columns get 6 million euro facelift, 
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2010),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/08/us-france-sculpture-
idUSTRE6074AX20100108. 
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Neubauer needed Raynaud’s permission to do so.119 Raynaud initially 
refused to permit Neubauer to move the statue, then changed his position. 
Raynaud stipulated he would approve the destruction on the condition that 
Neubauer employed Raynaud’s masons to execute the move, at a cost of 
twenty thousand euros.120 Raynaud also requested that if Neubauer sold the 
sculpture, Raynaud would receive seventy percent of the payment. To 
Neubauer, Raynaud’s assertion of the integrity right in the destruction 
context was an attempt to capture double payment for the sculpture.121 
Without Raynaud’s permission, Neubauer could neither remove nor destroy 
the sculpture, at the risk of paying damages for Raynaud’s moral rights, 
unless he could show the removal of the piece was necessary for security 
reasons. 
While Raynaud exercised his right to integrity to prevent destruction 
for financial purposes, and Buren argued for destruction to procure funding 
to protect the integrity of his work, another artist threatened to destroy his 
work without seeking any remuneration. After the mayor of a French city 
painted a sculpture by Alain Mila without his consent, Mila protested the 
act, noting that it undermined his work and values.122 Mila found political 
overtones in the alteration, observing that the color the mayor painted the 
sculpture resembled the color of the notorious conservative party Front 
National.123 Mila received the support of the Minister of Culture, Aurélie 
Filippetti, who denounced the mayor’s conduct as “a manifest violation of 
moral rights and the elementary rules of the intellectual property code and 
the protection of patrimony.”124 In response, the mayor denied that the 
sculpture was a work of art, dismissing the allegations of political 
exploitation of the work by characterizing his decision to paint as a 
functional alteration to a non-artistic installation. It is notable that Mila did 
not seek compensation, but publicly objected to the non-consensual 
recasting of his work into a vehicle for a politician’s expression of partisan 
affiliation. While no court has ruled on this issue, in a similar case 
involving unauthorized changes to a column by artist Carlos Cruz Diez, the 
 
 119.  Alice Antheaume, Cette oeuvre d’art n’existe plus . . . [This work of art no longer exists . . . ], 
20 MINUTES (Jan. 15. 2008), http://www.20minutes.fr/culture/206355-20080115-oeuvre-art-existe-plus. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Le maire FN de Hayange juge “sinister” une sculpture, il la fait repeindre [The FN mayor of 
Hayange repaints a “sinister” sculpture], L’EXPRESS (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/le-maire-fn-de-hayange-juge-sinistre-une-sculpture-il-la-
fait-repeindre_1562581.html. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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work’s nature as a piece of art was denied.125 Mila and Diez’s experiences 
show that the artists most in danger of having a work of art successfully co-
opted by a political party are those whose pieces can be redefined as non-
artistic according to the predominant aesthetic. 
B.  Destruction as a Moral Right Outside France 
According to Alexandre Pintiaux, Belgian courts decide disputes over 
the right to destroy by weighing the various interests of both parties.126  In 
one notable case, a mural painted on the wall of a pool deteriorated over 
time due to humidity. Restoration would have been costly, so the judge 
ordered the destruction of the work instead of restoration. Pintiaux notes 
that there is no prevailing rule, as these cases are highly fact-specific. 
Although integrity is a moral right, Belgian judges consider “economic and 
commercial interests, the importance of the work, the cost of renovation, 
the capacity of persons, and obligation to maintain what rests on the 
property,” among other factors.127 The criteria for evaluating the subjective 
“importance of the work” element remain unclear. Under a moral rights 
theory, the importance of the work would be addressed by adhering to the 
author’s wishes. It seems that in the Belgian context, the author’s desires 
are less compelling than a pragmatic assessment of cost. 
Recent actions by graffiti artists in Germany reinforce the appeal of 
destruction as a means of enforcing the integrity right. Lutz Henke, co-
creator of Berlin’s famous Kreuzberg murals, published an editorial in The 
Guardian in December 2014 explaining why he and his partners destroyed 
their iconic works by painting over them in black.128 Henke wanted to 
clarify to the public that the destruction occurred at the hands of the artists 
themselves, as many had assumed developers were responsible. 
According to Henke, the meaning and significance of the murals had 
changed from the artists’ original intent due to gentrification and 
“zombification” in Berlin.129 The murals, created as resistance art, over 
time came to be used in advertising for the city. Henke wrote 
 
 125.  Art à La Roche. Sa sculpture jetée, l’artiste Carlos Cruz-Diez réagit [Art in La Roche. Pier 
sculpture, the artist Carlos Cruz-Diez reacts], OUEST-FRANCE (July, 17 2014), http://www.ouest-
france.fr/art-la-roche-sa-sculpture-jetee-lartiste-carlos-cruz-diez-reagit-2705329. 
 126.  Alexandre Pintiaux, Detruie une oeuvre d’art [Destroy a work of art], (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.lesoir.be/611990/article/culture/marche-l-art/2014-07-30/detruire-une-oeuvre-d-art. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Lutz Henke, Why We Painted over Berlin’s Most Famous Graffiti, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/19/why-we-painted-over-berlin-graffiti-
kreuzberg-murals?CMP=fb_gu. 
 129.  Id. 
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Gentrification in Berlin lately doesn’t content itself with destroying 
creative spaces. Because it needs its artistic brand to remain attractive, it 
tends to artificially reanimate the creativity it has displaced, thus 
producing an ‘undead city’. This zombification is threatening to turn 
Berlin into a museal city of veneers, the ‘art scene’ preserved as an 
amusement park for those who can afford the rising rents.130 
While their decision to destroy the work was an attempt to reclaim it as 
resistance art, Henke also considered the destruction inevitable. The murals 
“were doomed to disappear” from the moment of their inception, because 
“it is the nature of street art to occupy space in celebration of its 
uncertainty, being aware of its temporality and fleeting existence.”131 The 
fulfillment of this destiny at the hands of the artists constitutes a scenario in 
which destruction was necessary to prevent the work from being preserved 
unnaturally against authorial intent. 
Henke destroyed his work without seeking prior legal approval. While 
he may have been able to do this because the location of the work 
prevented a private owner from excluding Henke’s access, he and his peers 
still encountered the risk that the state would intervene in the destruction by 
labeling it an act of vandalism. Henke’s exercise of a right to destroy 
without formal approval subtly emphasizes the fundamental nature of an 
author’s connection to their work; here, public justification of the act is an 
afterthought, not a prerequisite. 
Henke illuminates the right to destroy as a tool of maintaining the 
integrity of a work’s message, particularly difficult to manage where the 
medium (street art, graffiti) necessarily places the piece at the mercy of its 
environment. Henke also raises a relatively new question for the right to 
destroy: How do we conceptualize integrity and destruction in a genre of 
art that incorporates the eventual destruction of the work as an inherent 
condition of its existence? 
C.  Art Speech: Manipulation and Covert Censorship 
As recent European examples show, authors have publicly stated their 
intent to destroy their works under circumstances where they felt that 
government actors had appropriated and altered the meaning of their work. 
Analyzing art as a discrete category of speech, one can see how even a 
minor manipulation of a work could impede an author’s expression. 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
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Edward Eberle argues that art speech is entitled to protection both on 
the basis of its uniqueness and its satisfaction of conventional protection 
rationales. Eberle defines art speech as “the autonomous use of the artist’s 
creative process to make and fashion form, color, symbol, image, 
movement or other communication of meaning that is made manifest in a 
tangible medium.”132 The special nature of art lies in its availability as a 
form of non-verbal communication, which encapsulates non-rational, non-
cognitive aspects of the human experience excluded by written expression, 
and its existence in a private sphere of internal freedom not subject to 
traditional social and political regulation.133 Art speech engages the author 
and audience in a particular object-subject relationship, a dialogue 
characterized by “the flow of sensory, emotional or intuitional data.”134 
This process gives art speech particular importance as a space for 
imaginative human autonomy and self-definition protected from 
government interference for its own set of reasons. 
Art speech can also be protected under conventional free speech 
rationales. Hegel viewed art as truth revealing, claiming art offered a 
medium through which it is possible to present valuable knowledge and 
insight, as do other forms of speech.135 Art speech may serve a liberty-
enhancing purpose linked to both the artist and observer’s human dignity. 
The expression of political critique in art speaks to its checking function, 
and examples abound of political actors threatened by the ideological 
challenges represented in works of art.136 The safety valve speech rationale 
also applies to art, which can function as an escape from society or provide 
an alternative version of society, thus facilitating the release of tension that 
could otherwise manifest in socially destructive behavior.137 
The ways in which governments attempt to co-opt art speech and 
undermine these values differ depending on numerous historical and 
political factors. Under both the Nazi and Soviet regimes, artists were 
expected to further dominant state ideologies in their work; those who 
refused were held up as “degenerative” and subjected to political 
 
 132.  Edward J. Eberle, Art and Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 1, 7 (2007). 
 133.  Id. at 4, 6, 9. 
 134.  Id. at 9. 
 135.  Id. at 8. 
 136.  Eberle discusses Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the photos of Abu Ghraib abuses, and 
Mathieu Kassovitz’s prescient 1995 film on the social inequality and the banlieues of Paris, La Haine, 
as examples. See Alan Riding, In France, Artists have Sounded the Warning Bells for Years, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/24/arts/design/in-france-artists-have-
sounded-the-warning-bells-for-years.html. 
 137.  Id. at 10. 
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sanction.138 However, state interference in artistic expression is hardly a 
relic of World War II and the Cold War. Agnès Tricoire asks, “Still today, 
from Cuba to Syria, from China to Tunisia, how many authors are in prison 
for not having served predefined collective interests?”139 The “collective 
interest” here refers to art serving a “useful” or propagandistic function. 
Non-totalitarian governments may use more subtle methods of coercing 
ideological compliance, with the means taken corresponding to the 
mechanism140 by which a particular genre of art expresses its meaning. 
The distinction between fiction and non-fiction, which in the French 
context determines the boundaries of hate speech, reveals an interplay 
between the authorial voice and the existence of multiple meanings within 
a work that can be extrapolated to the issue of politically appropriated 
visual art. Tricoire argues that the law should not protect freedom of 
expression for works that incite hatred, such as racist and anti-Semitic 
work, but the treatment of objectionable content diverges when expressed 
in the realm of non-fiction versus fiction.141 To explain the significance of 
the distinction between the two, she uses the criteria of “la polysémie de 
l’œuvre,” or the multiplicity of meanings of a work. Following from the 
theories of Gautier, Baudelaire, and Flaubert that “the thought of the author 
is not that of the characters, nor the narrator,”142 Tricoire asserts that artistic 
works have polysemic meanings. In fact, a piece that only has one meaning 
would instead be categorized as a single idea, or an advertisement, rather 
than an artistic work.143 Narrative fiction, a genre conducive to contrary and 
contrarian meanings, is polysemic.144 Since visual art is not categorized 
according to the dichotomy of fiction and non-fiction, the question of how 
polysemic meaning is constructed and perceived in visual art may be more 
obscure. 
The example of Alain Mila’s sculpture, painted the color of the Front 
National by a city mayor, demonstrates how political coercion can disrupt a 
polysemic work of art by reducing its significance to a one-dimensional 
political statement. First, when the mayor denies Mila’s sculpture is an 
 
 138.  Id. at 6, n.32, n.33. 
 139.  Agnès Tricoire, Les Dangers du Relativisme pour la Liberté de l’Art, 121, 138, 
http://www.agnestricoire-avocat.fr/. 
 140. For example, while both a novel and a painting might make use of a pastiche of fantasy and 
reality, meaning is constituted in different structures and techniques in a written work than a visual one 
and would thus be vulnerable to different types of distortions. 
 141.  Id. at 121. 
 142.  Id. at 135. 
 143.  Id. at 143. 
 144.  Id. 
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artistic work at all, he is removing the work from consideration as an object 
that carries and expresses multiple meanings. Second, by painting the 
sculpture his party’s color, the mayor takes the work hostage, transforming 
it to serve his interests. The mayor’s act functions as a way to replace the 
original meanings infused by the author. The nonconsensual nature of this 
transformation is itself an enactment of the model of extreme right-wing 
governance envisioned by the Front National.145 Thus, the mayor does not 
just symbolically express a political ideology, he engages in its 
methodology through a direct subversion of artistic speech. 
The mayor’s alteration resembles the use of popular songs for political 
campaigns without permission, which encourages a public identification of 
the message of the work and the image of the artist with those of the 
political actor. For example, in 2012 Francois Hollande released a 
Presidential campaign advertisement set to Jay-Z and Kanye West’s 
“N**gas in Paris.”146 The music served to showcase (or some would say, 
exploit147) Hollande’s visit to the Parisian suburb Creil, in order to present 
an image of the candidate that was appealing to young Black and Arab 
voters.  A politician on the campaign trail likely does not alter the song 
itself, but presents it in a specific context linked to their platform. The artist 
may resist the implied association by publicly expressing disapproval and 
demanding that the politician cease their use of the work, as happened 
repeatedly to Mitt Romney in 2012.148 Even if the politician could not be 
legally compelled to stop their use due to the applicable licensing scheme, 
the negative attention an artistic rejection would draw to the candidate 
ensures some extralegal protection for the offended artist. In contrast, an 
artist in Mila’s position must take a more assertive stance to counteract the 
invasive use of their work, which goes beyond implied ideological approval 
to actual physical transformation. 
 
 145.  This is a broad characterization, but fitting for an extreme right-wing party that has repeatedly 
engaged in Holocaust minimalism and called for the rearmament of French imperialism. See Bruno 
Waterfield, Jean-Marie Le Pen Repeats Holocaust Comments in European Parliament, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/5050338/Jean-Marie-Le-Pen-repeats-
Holocaust-comments-in-European-Parliament.html. 
 146.  ‘N**gas in Paris’ a Winning Campaign Ad or Offensive ‘Ethnic’ Marketing?, CNN (Apr. 30, 
2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-politician-uses-offensive-song/. 
 147.  Ashley Fantz, N**gas in Paris’: A Winning Campaign Ad or Offensive ‘Ethnic’ Marketing?,  
CNN.COM (Apr. 30, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-politician-uses-
offensive-song/. 
 148.  Justin Sullivan, Mitt Romney Asked to Quit Using ‘Eye of the Tiger,’ Among Others, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/8-politicians-scolded-by-musicians-
over-song-use/2/. 
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In various ways, the mayor obliterates Mila’s control over the physical 
and intellectual contours of his work. Mila is left with few options for 
resistance. One path is to publicly contest the alteration and add to the 
speech around his work in the public sphere; the other is to repaint the 
work according to his authorial voice, restoring his speech in accordance 
with his vision.  Public contestation of the work serves several purposes, so 
long as adequate attention is drawn to the issue. It makes clear that Mila 
does not endorse the change to his work, nor its resulting association with 
the Front National. In Mila’s case, the distinction between the authorial 
voice and other voices in the sculpture as a single entity is less self-evident, 
thus increasing the risk that the public will perceive the color alteration as 
the voice of the author himself. Farida Shaheed, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, noted in 2013 that 
An artwork differs from non-fictional statements, as it provides a far 
wider scope for assigning multiple meanings . . . and interpretations 
given to an artwork do not necessarily coincide with the author’s 
intended meaning. Artistic expressions and creations do not always 
carry, and should not be reduced to carrying, a specific message or 
information.149 
While an audience may attribute meanings to the work that the author did 
not intend due to the attenuated nature of the interpretive act, interference 
by government actors subverts the unique subject-object relationship and 
ensures the audience will misinterpret the work. 
Given the singularity of individual sculptures, Mila cannot easily 
substitute new works to compensate for what has been done to this 
particular work. Whereas novels can be printed in different editions in 
various jurisdictions, accompanied by explanatory prefaces conveying the 
author’s approval, reproductions of a sculpture do not achieve the same 
effect. A reproduction does not occupy the original installation space, 
which is part of the work’s context, a component of meaning. The meaning 
of a novel is more transportable than that of a sculpture, as its elements can 
be reconstituted coherently outside of the physical structure of a specific 
edition. The novel itself presumes mass reproduction as the means of 
disclosure, in contrast to an individual sculpture. Mila’s public statement in 
favor of destruction may be the only effective corrective measure. Even if 
Mila does not expect the work to be destroyed, advocating for its 
destruction is the most extreme disavowal available to him. Mila’s protest 
implicitly asserts the rights of other authors, drawing attention to 
 
 149.  Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights), The Right to Freedom of 
Artistic Expression and Creativity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/34 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
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government action that could threaten other artists’ integrity rights and 
hopefully disincentivizing future abuses. 
If Mila instead were to repaint the work, perhaps the mayor would not 
intervene again and Mila would succeed in his restoration. Unless he was 
compensated for this labor, Mila would sacrifice a pecuniary interest to 
protect a moral interest, undermining the general author’s rights scheme in 
which these interests co-exist rather than conflict. Whether or not the 
mayor were to impermissibly paint Mila’s sculpture a second time, the very 
threat of a second appropriation backed by the financial resources at the 
mayor’s disposal highlights Mila’s vulnerability as an artist. Mila would 
also risk his restoration being labeled an act of vandalism. The mayor’s use 
of public resources and authority to disrupt author’s rights, valuable both to 
French citizens as the audience benefiting from artistic creation and to Mila 
himself as an author-citizen entitled to the protection of his legal rights, 
would constitute an expressive harm. 
Actions like those taken against Mila’s sculpture can constitute a 
subtle form of censorship in pursuit of “the suppression of political dissent, 
the quest for nation-building and pursuit of hegemonic policies.”150 Even 
where it is unclear what particular ideology underlies the nonconsensual 
alteration of an artist’s public work, the encroaching threat on art speech as 
an imaginative zone for the construction of autonomy speaks to a 
hegemonic politics that limits cultural expression in the shared public 
sphere. Shaheed notes the crucial importance of public space as an artistic 
forum, “as it allows people, including marginalized people, to freely 
access, enjoy and sometimes contribute to the arts, including in its most 
contemporary forms.”151 Political alteration of public art implies a model of 
exclusive state ownership of the public sphere, wherein government actors 
can avoid transparency by hijacking others’ expression for their messaging 
without disclosing their own identities outright. 
The Buren column dispute may qualify as a form of covert censorship 
according to the Special Rapporteur’s framework, as “financial cuts . . . 
against cultural institutions or specific artworks may also be a cover for 
censorship.”152 Preferential funding for artists who support the regime in 
power, as well as the withdrawal of support for art commissioned by 
previous administrations, can reduce the participation of certain artists and 
their ideas in the public sphere without triggering public concern as would 
 
 150.  Id. at 10. 
 151.  Id. at 14. 
 152.  Id. at 16. 
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overt censorship through formal restrictions. In this way, politically 
motivated artistic erasure does not have to rise to the level of Taliban or 
ISIS-style demolitions to have the damaging effect of restricting speech. 
III.  PRE-DISCLOSURE DESTRUCTION: WHO OWNS THE ARTIST’S 
SPEECH? 
Thus far, this discussion of the implications of an author’s quest to 
destroy in the context of art speech has focused on post-disclosure 
destruction as a reaction to post-disclosure appropriation. What is at stake 
when an established author seeks to destroy their work pre-disclosure? The 
examples of Franz Kafka and Diego Rivera illuminate how tensions around 
author-directed destruction play out pre-disclosure. 
Kafka bequeathed his unpublished manuscripts to his friend Max Brod 
with the specific instruction that they be destroyed upon his death.153 Brod 
rejected this directive by publishing several works in 1935 and, in turn, 
bequeathing the rest to Esther Hoffe, eventually leading to a lawsuit over 
the ownership of the materials in 2011.154 The dispute was resolved in 2012 
in a ruling that transferred ownership to the state of Israel, based on Brod’s 
instructions to Hoffe upon his own death.155 Despite the seemingly simple 
reasoning for the outcome, the arguments offered by competing parties 
broached complex notions of public ownership of Kafka’s artistic legacy 
that triumphed over Kafka’s explicit wishes for his work. 
Judith Butler catalogues the competing German and Jewish-Israeli 
claims to ownership of Kafka’s work, which invoked the German-speaking, 
Jewish, Czech-born Kafka’s cultural and linguistic belonging.156 The 
National Library of Israel argued Kafka did not belong to Hoffe’s 
beneficiaries, but “either to the ‘public good’ or else to the Jewish people,” 
two interests treated as identical at times.157 This argument framed Kafka as 
a “primarily Jewish writer,” and his writing as a cultural asset of the Jewish 
people, presuming Israel to be the representative of the Jewish people.158 
The presumption of who represents such a broad identity group is 
contestable, as Butler notes this claim denies both the perspective of non-
 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Judith Butler, Who Owns Kafka?, 33 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3, 3–8 (2011). 
 157.  Id. at 2. 
 158.  Id. 
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Israeli Jews and non-Jewish Israelis, implicitly attributing to Israel 
stewardship over “all significant Jewish cultural production.”159 
Though Kafka was Jewish, the question of whether to categorize his 
legacy as exclusively Jewish is significant in the competing claims to his 
unpublished work. The German Literature Archive challenged this 
proposition, offering an account of Kafka as belonging to the German 
language and literature, focusing on the “purity” of Kafka’s German. This 
reductive account of his German writing, troubling in its  reference to the 
concept of German purity, idealized Kafka’s imperfect fluency in German. 
It also relied on a concept of belonging which goes against the essence of 
much of Kafka’s work, “given the fact that [his] writing charts the 
vicissitudes of non-belonging, or of belonging too much.”160 Butler notes 
that Kafka was known for his comment on the Jewish people, “My people, 
provided that I have one.”161 
For an author whose identity fell under multiple categories, and whose 
work touched upon a persistent sense of non-belonging, it is remarkable 
that competing litigants sought judicial resolution of his primary identity as 
the basis for dismissing his own desire for his work’s destruction. Had 
Kafka been alive when this dispute took place, perhaps the outcome would 
have been different, as the living artist’s rights to their work should counter 
the derivative notion of “cultural ownership” constructed by various 
groups. Nonetheless, the Kafka example reveals the type of interpretation 
that follows from a thwarted pre-disclosure destruction claim for an artist 
of significance. Kafka’s heritage and personal beliefs offered ambiguous 
evidence over who should inherit from the artist the modern stewardship of 
his work, taking precedence over the property-based chain of title. These 
competing accounts served political interests, as the victory over which 
country could claim Kafka as their own transformed the dispute into a 
mechanism of national identity construction. Israel’s legal victory is a 
historical one, as its National Library’s custody of the physical manuscripts 
confers upon the state the status as Kafka’s symbolic home in the 
continuing future. This concept of home is not just based on abstract 
association, but on the state’s tangible control over Kafka’s speech vis-à-
vis his unpublished manuscripts. In this way, the state can control the art 
speech of the deceased much as it controls the speech of the living—by 
controlling public access. 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 8. 
 161.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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In contrast to Kafka, Diego Rivera initiated the pre-disclosure 
destruction of his work in a high-profile dispute with the Rockefeller 
family. In 1932, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. commissioned Rivera to paint a 
mural in Rockefeller Center.162 The mural was to depict a “Man at the 
Crossroads Looking with Hope and High Vision to the Choosing of a New 
and Better Future.”163 An openly Communist artist strongly devoted to his 
leftist ideals, Rivera initially agreed to paint the image of a soldier, a 
worker, and a peasant clasping hands.164 However, after being criticized for 
“selling out” by agreeing to paint for the industrialist Rockefellers, Rivera 
decided to add the figure of Vladimir Lenin to the mural, saying, “[i]f you 
want communism, I will paint communism.”165 In addition, Rivera depicted 
the senior Rockefeller “drinking martinis with a harlot and various other 
things that were unflattering to the [Rockefeller] family.”166 
The Rockefellers repeatedly requested Rivera change his mural, which 
had been painted as a fresco and thus could not be moved, leaving only the 
choice of alteration or destruction. Nelson Rockefeller wrote to Rivera that 
because the mural was in a public place, it risked offending a large number 
of people.167 Rivera refused to change the mural, declaring that, “[r]ather 
than mutilate the conception, I should prefer the physical destruction of the 
conception in its entirety, but preserving, at least, its integrity.”168 In 
response, Rockefeller had the mural destroyed. Rivera later recalled that he 
had not expected “that a presumably cultured man like Rockefeller would 
act upon my words so literally and so savagely” by destroying the work.169 
Despite the ambiguity over Rivera’s intentions, he described the 
destruction as an act of “cultural vandalism,” much as Buren described the 
damage to his columns in Paris.170 Rivera painted a replica of the mural 
faithful to his artistic vision in Mexico City, and the reputation of the 
Rockefellers as art patrons was diminished by the affair. 
The Rivera case gives a unique glimpse into how a powerful patron 
can control political content during the process of creating a work, such 
 
 162.  Allison Keyes, Destroyed by Rockefellers, Mural Trespassed on Political Vision, NPR.ORG 
(Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/09/287745199/destroyed-by-rockefellers-mural-trespassed-
on-political-vision. 
 163.  Biography: Diego Rivera, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/biography/rockefellers-rivera/. 
 164.  Keyes, supra note 163. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  PBS.ORG, supra note 164. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
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that the artist would attempt to reassert control with the most extreme 
threat: total destruction. While this threat has worked for artists like Buren, 
the question of whether Rivera maintained the integrity of his work is less 
clear in light of his later comments casting his threat as a bluff. Rivera 
succeeded insofar as resisting the completion and disclosure of a work 
going against his political and artistic principles, but the outcome of the 
ultimatum may not have been his underlying goal. 
The Rockefellers’ action in this case suggests a conflict between 
multiple audiences when it comes to the preservation of art speech. Their 
reference to possible offense to a segment of the intended audience may 
have been pre-textual, but it enabled the patron to occupy the position of 
public representative in order to stifle explicitly political art speech that 
may have resonated with some portion of the audience. Though the 
Rockefellers presented the Center as a public space, it was actually a mixed 
private-public space, as their ownership of the eponymous building 
effectuated their control of the mural. The Center’s availability to public 
traffic did not render it any less of a privately controlled institution. The 
Rivera mural highlights the danger of quasi-public spaces, which gain part 
of their prominence due to a misleading characterization as public spaces, 
yet are susceptible to manipulation by private actors with ownership rights. 
Rivera wrote in a letter at the time, “If someone buys the Sistine 
Chapel, does he have the authority to destroy it?”171 This comment 
discloses Rivera’s perspective on who bears responsibility for the 
destruction. Though it was Rivera who initially suggested destruction, 
perhaps such a suggestion does not carry conclusive weight in light of the 
evident power disparity between the wealthy patron and the artist working 
on commission. Unlike the Sistine Chapel, Rivera’s mural was not 
disclosed to the public, precluding the opportunity to gain valued historical 
status that could have afforded the artist more power. Had Rivera somehow 
disclosed his mural, it might have acquired cultural value that could have 
given him more control over its fate, in opposition to the Rockefellers. 
IV.  STREET ART AND THE RIGHT TO DESTROY 
Where the choice to destroy is ultimately wielded by the artist, the 
context in which destruction takes place shapes the significance of the 
destructive act. This applies to the temporal context, as demonstrated by 
Kafka and Rivera, as well as the physical context, as discussed with Buren, 
 
 171.  Keyes, supra note 163. 
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Mila and Henke. The existence of public spaces that serve as “revolving 
canvases,” for example, particular walls in Paris famous for their ever-
changing murals,172 adds an evolving dimension to the debate. For artists 
who create their work in such spaces, destruction is presumed. The 
inevitability of the destruction of their work is a function of the space’s 
shared nature; each artist paints over their predecessor’s work, implicitly 
consenting to their successor’s decision to do the same. While their work is 
temporarily fixed, possibly satisfying the elements of a copyrightable work 
in the short-term, the common recognition of the space as an informal 
gallery contributes to the brief lifespan of each work. No artist has a 
permanent claim to the canvas; no artist can remove the canvas to control 
its exhibition once their work has been created. The development of these 
specific locations as displays for high-profile street art could only occur 
with the acceptance of the property owners, who may indirectly benefit 
from the attention the murals draw but do not have a means to charge 
passerby for the pleasure of observing them. 
The choice to create a work in such a space is an act of resistance to 
the commercialization of street art. While Berlin’s Kreuzberg murals came 
to be seen by their creators as casualties to the “zombification” of the 
gentrifying city, the works’ prominence relied on their continued existence. 
A mural that disappears within a week does not have the opportunity to 
become a landmark. Artists who purposely create work in and on spaces 
known for their turnover can thus reject attempts to commodify their 
expression through the conventional consumption of art. In presenting their 
work on public streets, they also dispense with the access fee that private 
institutions impose on viewers. Any passerby can observe the work without 
pressure (or even the option) to pay the artist or a middleman. The use of 
everyday public contexts, such as walls that come to be identified as 
displays by virtue of their use as such rather than by the establishment of 
formal galleries, rejects the idea that art is circumscribed to elite-controlled 
environments. Revolving canvases, defined by the inevitability of the 
destruction of the works they host, reflect an anti-elitist democratic 
 
 172.  The walls framing Radio Marais on Rue Chapon are one example of what I call a public 
“revolving canvas.” Street artists paint large-scale murals on two particular walls framing the Radio 
Marais building on a nearly weekly basis.  The process appears to be formally unregulated but guided 
by informal norms of the street art community. Another example of such a space is located on Canal 
Saint-Martin, just north of République. The corner wall of an apartment building, overlooking a small 
public square, is the site of a variety of murals and graffiti tags, constantly changing and building on 
one another. On the rare occasion that the Canal wall is co-opted for commercial purposes, such as 
advertisements for music festivals, the next round of street art effectively cuts short the temporary 
commercialization and transforms the wall back from a billboard into a public canvas. 
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ideology on the meaning of art in relation to the public. This ideology, 
though broad and amorphous, is no less political in its nature than the 
arguments made by the artists discussed throughout this paper. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Authors may explicitly claim a right to destroy their work in order to 
protect it or embrace the right to destroy through the spaces in which they 
create. This distinction exemplifies the varying approaches to the right to 
destroy in relation to economic rights. While Buren’s public discourse on 
destruction enabled him to secure millions of euros for restoration, other 
artists have utilized the theme of destruction to reject the economic benefits 
of their work. By implicitly ceding the right to destroy to the next artist to 
use the space, they produce their own framework for navigating moral 
rights.  
The right to destroy may be the artist’s ultimate rhetorical weapon to 
defend their work. The artist employing this “nuclear option” may hope its 
mere mention will function as a deterrent to protracted conflict, but may 
not necessarily intend to exercise it to completion. Notwithstanding the 
philosophical and legal bases for an artist’s right to destroy, real examples 
demonstrate that the question of who can destroy, or prevent the 
destruction of, a work may often be someone besides the artist. The tension 
over the ultimate disposition of a work speaks to the many valuable 
purposes served by the creation of art speech, as well as the conflicts 
arising when its multiple beneficiaries are unequally situated in terms of 
political and financial influence. 
 
